Sri Lanka enters a presidential election like no other before it
As Sri Lankans prepare to elect a new president, with voting on 21 September, the political landscape is more crowded and competitive than ever. Astrologers, who in past elections would typically appear on national television to make predictions, are conspicuously absent this time around – perhaps because a few lawmakers have argued that such predictions violate election laws, perhaps because few want to stick their necks out given the current electoral landscape. A record 38 candidates will be on the ballot, but only a few have a realistic chance of becoming Sri Lanka’s new president. The country’s presidential elections have historically been two-horse races, but the 2024 election looks to be one of the most open and unpredictable to date.
The contest is intense among the three leading candidates: the incumbent president, Ranil Wickremesinghe; Anura Kumara Dissanayake of the left-leaning National People’s Power (NPP) coalition; and the current opposition leader, Sajith Premadasa, from the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB). Another contender is Namal Rajapaksa, the son of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa from the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP). But the possibility of another Rajapaksa ascending to the presidency appears slim after mass protests in 2022 led to the ouster of Namal’s uncle Gotabaya Rajapaksa. With more candidates in the fray, many pundits predict that no single candidate will secure the minimum 50-percent majority vote required to clinch the presidency. In this scenario, the possibility of an unprecedented count of preferential votes to determine the winner looms large, adding another layer of uncertainty.
The contenders
Wickremesinghe’s campaign, titled “Puluwan Sri Lanka” or “Sri Lanka Can”, is gaining momentum. He is contesting as an independent candidate and his message is unmistakably consistent: he stepped forward when Sri Lanka was in crisis after the exit of Gotabaya in 2022, and managed to restore economic and political stability. Indeed, the long lines for fuel, milk powder, gas and other essentials that were a hallmark of the 2022 crisis have disappeared, and economic activity is again on the rise. The country’s foreign exchange reserves have also seen a significant boost, thanks to a bailout package agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), record-breaking tourist arrivals in 2024 and increased remittances from Sri Lankans working abroad. Wickremesinghe’s chosen electoral symbol is a gas cylinder – a reminder of the queues and shortages of 2022.
Two years ago, the Janatha Aragalaya – or the People’s Struggle, as the protest movement was widely known – demanded the resignation not just of Gotabaya Rajapaksa but also of Wickremesinghe, then the prime minister, recognising his role in perpetuating Sri Lanka’s malignant political culture. Despite this, Wickremesinghe was elected as president after Rajapaksa’s exit by a parliament dominated by the SLPP. Wickremesinghe’s first act as president was to dismantle the Gota Go Gama protest encampment in Colombo using the military and police. The government, headed by Wickremesinghe, then proceeded to arrest key protest leaders using draconian legislation such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act. These acts were welcomed by the parliament’s SLPP majority, who were desperate to maintain their grip on power. Over 100 MPs from the Rajapaksa-led government – the government responsible for plunging Sri Lanka into its worst economic crisis – have since thrown their support behind Wickremesinghe. Yet, despite these associations, many view Wickremesinghe as the safer choice among the 2024 contenders due to his experience and political acumen.
In the 2019 presidential election, Anura Kumara Dissanayake secured only about three percent of the vote. In the 2020 parliamentary election, the NPP won just three seats in the 225-seat house. These performances earned it the mocking label of the “3-percent party”. For the 2024 contest, however, Dissanayake’s campaign has steadily grown in strength over the past year, making him a serious contender.
The NPP has tapped into the widespread dissatisfaction and economic hardship caused by IMF-linked austerity measures. It has pledged to combat corruption and improve government efficiency. But Dissanayake must also contend with the baggage that comes with his party – the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which is the largest component of the NPP. While Dissanayake has strong support among younger voters, those aged 50 and above remain wary of him due to memories of the 1987-89 JVP insurrection, known as the Bheeshanaya, a period of terror in southern Sri Lanka that led to between 60,000 to 100,000 deaths. But while the party’s violent past in the 1970s and 1980s remains a concern for voters, it is also important to consider more recent history.
The JVP aligned with Mahinda Rajapaksa during the 2005 presidential election and played a crucial role in his victory by consolidating the vote of Sri Lanka’s Sinhala Buddhist majority. The JVP also backed the government’s military campaign to end the civil war against the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, thus bolstering its nationalist image but also tying itself to controversial aspects of Rajapaksa’s regime, including allegations of human rights violations during the conflict.
To address this, the JVP has rebranded itself as part of the broader NPP coalition. The NPP has put forward a 233-page manifesto detailing its plans if Dissanayake is elected president. Like the manifestos of the other leading candidates, it is polished, well designed, and filled with numerous ambitious promises.
At a recent debate organised by the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce, featuring economic policy experts representing the top four candidates, Harshana Suriyapperuma, the NPP’s representative, emphasised the coalition’s anti-corruption stance but offered little detail on its proposed economic policies. Sri Lankans have heard similar anti-corruption rhetoric before, most notably during the 2015 presidential election, which brought to power a government headed by Maithripala Sirisena and with Wickremesinghe as prime minister. That government struggled with implementing what it had promised, leading to widespread disenchantment. This history has left many questioning whether the NPP and Dissanayake can truly deliver on their promises, or if they will face the same challenges when translating rhetoric into action.
Sajith Premadasa has a solid support base, as evidenced by his performance in the previous presidential election, where he garnered 5.5 million votes – representing roughly 42-percent vote share. However, this was before Premadasa split from the United National Party headed by Wickremesinghe to set up his own party, the SJB. Premadasa has made bold claims on the campaign trail: he has pledged to abolish Sri Lanka’s executive presidency, renegotiate the IMF bailout deal, reduce taxes to ease the cost of living, and fully implement the 13th Amendment, which would mean the devolution of power to provincial councils and a step away from a unitary state.
But the broader cohort supporting Premadasa includes discredited politicians who were once part of the Rajapaksa administrations, figures such as G L Peiris, Patali Champika Ranawaka, Dullas Alahapperuma and Dayasiri Jayasekara. As a result, Premadasa is not necessarily a candidate of systemic change. This alignment might work in his favour, given that the Sri Lankan electorate has historically leaned towards conservative choices. Moreover, Premadasa is seen as a credible alternative by those who view Wickremesinghe as too closely aligned with the Rajapaksas, earning him the moniker “Ranil Rajapaksa”.
The minority vote
Sri Lanka’s minority communities have at times acted as kingmakers in the country’s elections. In these polls too, their votes could be the deciding factor, and all three top candidates are actively courting minority electorates.
On paper, Premadasa seems to have made notable progress, securing the support of major Muslim political parties including the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and All Ceylon Makkal Congress. But the Muslim-led National Congress has thrown its weight behind Wickremesinghe. Muslim communities are still reeling from the stigmatisation they faced following the Easter Sunday attacks of 2019 and the rampant Islamophobia seen in Sri Lanka during the Covid-19 pandemic, which included the government’s denial of burial rites to Muslims. As a result, they remain wary of establishment politicians, and while the government has since issued a formal apology for forcible cremations, the scars remain. The Muslim electorate remains apprehensive about the return of communalist rhetoric and policies, particularly given that Wickremesinghe’s present government includes parliamentarians who have only recently defected from the Rajapaksa-led SLPP, which has a record of promoting Islamophobia.
For Tamil communities in the North and East of Sri Lanka, the presidential race presents a conundrum. The leading candidates are all Sinhala, and while all have made many promises they have spoken little about the “national question” – the political, social and economic grievances of the Tamils, who have long sought greater autonomy and recognition of their rights. The ongoing mass military presence in the North and East, along with the suppression of peaceful post-war memorialisation and the contentious “Buddhisisation” of these regions, continues to fuel Tamil discontent. There has been a notable increase in the construction of Buddhist temples and statues there, and in the discovery of ruins, stupas and other structures that are declared as Buddhist and given protection as archaeological sites. These declarations have often been contentious. Tamil communities continue to seek justice for war crimes and human-rights violations committed by the armed forces during the civil war, yet these demands remain largely unaddressed.
In an act of symbolic resistance, Tamil parties have fielded a common Tamil presidential candidate, P Ariyanethran, to highlight Sinhala leaders’ lethargy when it comes to addressing the national question. But the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK), one of the main Tamil parties, remains riven by discord. The ITAK’s central committee has announced that they will back Premadasa, while the party’s elected leader, S Shritharan, has stated that the majority of the party supports Ariyanethran. The ITAK’s internal confusion may lead Tamils to back a candidate with a realistic chance of winning rather than casting a purely symbolic vote for Ariyanethran. Yet Dissanayake’s lack of presence in the North and East, and Wickremesinghe’s focus on economic issues rather than the national question, could well tip the scales in Premadasa’s favour.
At a recent NPP rally in Jaffna, in the North, Dissanayake made a controversial appeal to the people. He urged them to join in what he claimed would be a victory for the NPP in the Sinhala-dominated South, and added that the North should not be “labelled as opposing this huge change”. Facing declining support in the North and East, Dissanayake may have intended to make a bold appeal, but his statement backfired. Wickremesinghe capitalised on the situation by asserting that Dissanayake owed an apology to the people of the North for what he said, which could be construed as a warning for the Tamil minority to not defy the Sinhala majority. Such an apology could have helped Dissanayake’s cause in the North, but it never came.
Then, in a surprise move, the ITAK spokesperson M A Sumanthiran defended Dissanayake, or “comrade Anura”, arguing that he knew him well and that Dissanayake did not mean to express racist feelings. The defence was especially puzzling considering the ITAK’s support for Premadasa, and it highlighted the unpredictable nature of the election, where even experienced politicians are uncertain of the outcome. Sumanthiran and the ITAK might be hedging their bets in case Dissanayake wins the presidency.
The 2022 protests called for an end to the malignant partisan politics and the rampant corruption of previous regimes, and marked a critical moment in Sri Lanka’s political history. It was a collective stand for transparency, accountability and a redefinition of the relationship between the governed and the governing. The post-Aragalaya political consciousness could lead to voters rejecting candidates perceived as merely perpetuating the old system of corruption and nepotism. But the electorate may have forgotten some of the demands for systemic change as time has passed, and may now be swayed by promises of stability rather than continuing to push for the changes initiated by the protest movement.
The tripartite 2024 presidential race has fractured long-standing alliances, reshuffled party strongholds and divided electorates, making election projections near impossible. With the election nearing, a key member of Premadasa’s SJB, Thalatha Athukorala, resigned from her parliamentary seat to show support for Wickremesinghe and proposed unity with the incumbent’s UNP, from which the SJB split in 2020. Parliamentarians from both parties are now floating the idea of a merger. But while a joint SJB-UNP campaign may have defeated Dissanayake, history has shown that such alliances can end in disaster, as seen with the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government that ruled from 2015 to 2019. Additionally, a joint campaign would also lend credence to Dissanayake and the NPP’s rhetoric that the UNP and SJB are essentially the same.
Wickremesinghe has frequently targeted Premadasa in his rally speeches, revealing his disdain for him following the SJB’s split from the UNP. At present, Wickremesinghe appears determined to revive the UNP, which ended up with only a single seat at the last parliamentary election in 2020 – perhaps not to its former glory as the preeminent party in Sri Lanka, but at least to commanding a significant presence in the next parliament, which will be elected next year. Given these dynamics, a UNP-SJB merger in the final week leading up to the presidential election appears highly unlikely.
The closing months of presidential campaigns in Sri Lanka have historically been pivotal, often marked by dramatic events that have reshaped the race. In 1994, the assassination of the UNP minister Gamini Dissanayake paved the way for Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga to secure a landslide victory. In 1999, an attempt to assassinate Kumaratunga shifted public sentiment to see her reelected. The 2015 election was marked by Maithripala Sirisena’s dramatic defection from the Rajapaksa-led government to become the common opposition candidate, with his campaign gaining significant momentum in the weeks before the vote. Most recently, in the 2019 presidential vote, the Easter Sunday attacks and their aftermath played a crucial role in Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s rise to power as the electorate responded to his promise of safeguarding national security. The final days before the 2024 presidential election could also yet prove decisive, with every twist and turn potentially altering the outcome in what has been a highly capricious race.