In Balochistan, Pakistan again tries to find a military solution to a political problem

On 9 May, unidentified gunmen killed seven labourers from Punjab working in the city of Gwadar, on the coast of the Pakistani province of Balochistan. A month earlier, gunmen had boarded a bus in Balochistan’s Noshki district, identified nine residents of Punjab province by their documents, and shot them dead. Two other people were also killed on the Quetta–Noshki highway that day, possibly by the same gunmen. The Balochistan Liberation Army, a banned separatist group, claimed responsibility for the killings. These episodes recharged the national debate about the Baloch separatist movement, and set off fresh alarm over how it is becoming increasingly xenophobic. 

Of course, the xenophobia of the Baloch separatist movement is matched by the bigotry of the Punjabi-dominated Pakistan state, which, since it came into existence in 1947, has consistently failed to resolve the Baloch question by constitutional and political means. The state’s undue use of the military in Balochistan – as evident, for instance, in the enforced disappearances of thousands of Baloch people – has had a direct impact on the development of Baloch nationalism, turning it from a movement for provincial autonomy into a movement seeking separation from Pakistan. Now the powers that be, in all their wisdom, have decided to once again go down the same path by repackaging the old wine of military force in a new bottle. In June, with clamour growing over the recent attacks, they announced Azm-e-Istehkam – Resolve for Stability – a new anti-insurgency operation meant to bring the situation under control. Not having learnt lessons from the past military operations and frequent political interventions that have failed to quell the separatist insurgency in Balochistan, the Pakistan government is once again trying to find a military solution to a political problem.