
Nehru signing the first agreement on US assistance to India on 5 January 1952.
Photo: Flickr / U.S. Embassy New Delhi
Nehru could be the democratic ruler he was because once in office he faced so little opposition… Subjectively, any prospect of a dictatorship was alien to Nehru. But objectively, it was also quite unnecessary, so little temptation ever arose.
– Perry Anderson, The Indian Ideology
As Prime Minister Narendra Modi personalises Indian politics, to an extent not seen since Indira Gandhi’s time in power, comparisons have inevitably been drawn with the first such political personality of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru. As the quote from Perry Anderson’s book shows, an axiomatic feature of such commentary is the taken-for-granted omnipotence of the central deity. First Nehru, then Indira, now Modi: hero-worshipping Indians, it is said, get their just desserts.
However, were Nehru and Indira then, and Modi now, really all-powerful? Can anyone be so in the complex political democracy that is India? Louis Fischer, a distinguished American liberal journalist, an old India hand and, as an acclaimed biographer of Mohandas Gandhi, no stranger to the Indian public and its leader fascination, came to India in autumn 1952 with this belief and was unpleasantly surprised. Unpleasantly because, from being a disciple of Gandhi during the battle between nationalism and imperialism in mid-1940s, Fischer had transformed into a critic of Nehru for his non-aligned stand in the Cold War in the early-1950s. Between 13 August and 24 September 1952, Fischer was in India, travelling to major cities and meeting a cross-section of the Indian political and economic elite. He kept a diary on this visit (ten years since his first visit to India in the halcyon days of the Quit India movement of 1942), which is available in his papers at the Seeley G Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. The common theme of these diary entries is a reluctant admission by this Nehru-baiter that India’s first prime minister was neither all-knowing nor all-powerful, as it seemed from afar to Fischer and many of his fellow Americans.
At this time, Pyarelal Nayyar, Gandhi’s last Secretary and Fischer’s old friend, told him, “half the country seemed communalist and the other half was feared to be communist,” and Nehru’s striving for a middle space – fused within a problematic nationalism – was neither easy nor total. Jealousy among his colleagues, from Delhi’s Health Minister Sushila Nayyar to Union Health Minister Rajkumari Amrit Kaur; their unscrupulousness, from Union Food Minister Rafi Ahmed Kidwai to Finance Minister R K Shanmukham Chetty; and, opposition from the Communist Party of India on the left and the troika of Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha on the right, formed just the beginnings of his troubles.
Nehru’s deepest challenge came from within the state and his own Congress party. R C Dutt, a career bureaucrat during and after India’s independence, aptly summed it up, as recorded in Memoirs of Old Mandarins of India:
“The Civil Servants as well as the top leaders of the freedom movement, who became Ministers after Independence, came from the same class of society… Nehru was an exception… he had imbibed socialist values… With individual exceptions these values found no echo among the civil servants… the doctrines of Civil Service neutrality and freedom of expression enabled them to express contrary views and give contrary advice to their respective Ministers who, themselves uncommitted to Nehru’s socialism, readily accepted them.”
And yet, in the first general elections of 1951-52, these ministers were totally dependent on Nehru. Ring-side observers like Sudhir Ghosh, an emissary of Gandhi, and Dev Ram of Hindi-language publishing house Rajkamal made it clear to Fischer that but for Nehru, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Bharatiya Jana Sangh would have carried many provinces. Ram also surprised Fischer by informing him that contrary to the widespread assumption, pro-American books were actually more popular than pro-Russian. Fischer was very busy on 15 August 1952, India’s fifth Independence Day. It was a measure of his standing among the Indian elite and with the US Government that his morning was spent with President Rajendra Prasad at the Rashtrapati Bhavan, his afternoon with Pyarelal and his evening with Chester Bowles, US ambassador to India.
At the Rashtrapati Bhavan, Fischer was happy to find his biography of Gandhi in the Presidential library. Prasad, whose uneasy personal relations with Nehru was no secret, confessed to feeling “lonely and unhappy”, and spoke to Fischer principally about Pakistan-India relations. Fischer informed Prasad that before coming to India he was in Pakistan, where he felt that people were afraid of India and for the position of Muslims there. Prasad countered this by claiming that Muslims were treated better in India, where they were represented in the Union Cabinet, than non-Muslims in Pakistan. Nevertheless, inimical India-Pakistan relations meant a large defence budget, and this worried the president. He recalled how under British rule, the Congress party had objected to excessive military expenditure. During the 1946-47 interim coalition government, the budget had been limited to INR 100 million. In five years, it had more than doubled. When Fischer asked if India could give Azad Kashmir to Pakistan, thereby perhaps settling the dispute, Prasad replied that he “would be glad to do so”. Apart from this, Prasad wanted the restitution of refugee property by the government as a conciliatory gesture. He rightly worried that relations between India and Pakistan could only get worse when his generation was gone as he and Nehru had Muslim (and Pakistani) friends and believed in peace. How perversely these friendships could be interpreted became clear to Fischer in his very next meeting with Pyarelal, who poured scorn on Prasad’s views, declaring that Nehru, “a Westerner” was prejudiced and easily misled: “If [a] Moslem tell[s] him something, he will believe it.”
That evening, when Fischer met with Ambassador Bowles, he shared how pro-US in international matters Prasad had appeared to be and, encouraged by this, urged Bowles to challenge Nehru whenever he presented the US on the same plane as the USSR. Chester Bowles, a New-Deal Democrat from Connecticut, demurred and instead steered their discussion towards the Community Development Programme in India, in which 17 million peasants were to be covered in three years with US aid to the tune of USD 150 million per year. Both Prasad and Bowles had been in favour of these. Later, Fischer would describe Bowles as “not just pro-Indian but involved in the success of India… He talks like a businessman doing big business.”
The next day, Fischer met the men and the woman who were to be in charge of the 55 community development projects. When Bowles told Fischer that these Indians had no doubts about American goodwill and would help spread it all over the country, Fischer wryly commented that if this was true they represented the “best kind of infiltration”. Fischer found this lot wary of communists and the Soviet Union, and one of them told him that what India needed was an ‘efficient dictator’. Sidney Harrison of the Associated Press, who prophesied that lack of land reforms and action against landlords and moneylenders would hurt Congress eventually, had similar experiences. This prophecy was what the socialist opposition to Nehru was also banking on. Hosting Fischer, J B and Sucheta Kripalani, the veteran ex-Congress couple, echoed the idea: their new party of workers and peasants, Mazdoor Krishak Praja Party, would merge with the Socialists, who, led by another ex-Congress duo of Jayaprakash Narayan and Ram Manohar Lohia, wanted to consolidate nationally and also wanted to be in the vanguard of international socialism. Fischer suggested the name ‘Gandhian Socialist Party’ for their new enterprise. This appealed to Sucheta, who felt that this would allow them to capture Gandhi’s name from Nehru. The Kripalanis were disappointed in Nehru; Sucheta revealed that when Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhbhai Patel, the conservative organisational boss of the Congress, died in December 1950, the couple had gone to Nehru and said that now there was no obstruction to land reforms and he must get it started. Sucheta thought that something akin to the Kibbutz programme in Israel was needed in India. And only the socialists were capable of such constructive work.
Turning away from Nehru’s opponents towards his colleagues, on 17 August 1952, Fischer met with the Defence Minister N Gopalaswami Ayyangar, who was also in charge of Kashmir negotiations. Scheduled to leave for Geneva later in the week for talks on demilitarisation in Kashmir, with Sir Zafarullah Khan of Pakistan, Ayyangar agreed with Fischer that Kashmir should have never been placed before the UN, and that one person had acted as an intermediary. Explaining the current impasse, Ayyangar blurted out that while there could be agreement on the number of troops in the part of Kashmir “we occupy”, before correcting himself to say “under our control”, the question was of the troops in Azad Kashmir. There, Pakistan was ready to withdraw regular troops but that would leave irregulars, who might be dispersed but would still be able to influence plebiscite. When Fischer asked if it was not better to obviate the plebiscite through some arrangement, Ayyangar agreed but questioned whether Zafarullah had the power to carry out such an understanding. Ayyangar remembered that when he was prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir princely state from 1937 to 1943, Zafarullah had recommended a professor of Arabic in Srinagar, who had studied in India and Germany. After Ayyangar appointed the person, the next day a large, predominantly Muslim delegation met him and protested that “do you not know that he is an Ahmadiyya?” They argued he had been recommended by Zafarullah because he was himself of the same sect. When Fischer replied that Ghulam Muhammad, Pakistan’s governor-general (1951-1955), had assured him that he would support Zafarullah, Ayyangar said that Ghulam Muhammad was a sick man and Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin, Muhammad’s predecessor, did not look kindly upon Zafarullah. Discussing other matters, Ayyangar assured Fischer that since the 1951-52 general elections, communists in India had begun to be interested in parliamentary “points of order and tricks”. When Fischer queried about Nehru being soft on the left internally and on Russia and China externally, Ayyangar countered that Nehru’s praise for communism was abstract and always qualified. Finally, when Fischer asked why India was spending more than INR 200 million on defence, Ayyangar shot back, “your country set the pace for us.”