Thus, many in Pakistan believe that the US and NATO drawdown will be a victory for the Taliban as a whole. The aforementioned document, leaked to the Pakistani press, states that the Afghan Taliban will continue to provide strategic depth to Pakistan-based militants. The Taliban, inspired by a borderless ummah, consider state boundaries irrelevant. Militant Islamists are to be supported wherever they struggle. The report adds that with the “the departure of the US troops, the TTP and its multiple partners will pursue their ‘jihad’ with renewed vigour under the banner of setting up a true Islamic Caliphate in Pakistan.”
Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan allowed Pakistan’s sectarian organisations to operate bases and training facilities on Afghan soil. During his 1997-1999 tenure, current Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif attempted a crackdown on sectarian outfits only to have his government’s efforts scuttled by none other than Taliban forces and their allies in Pakistan. Escape routes were likely organised by operatives within the Pakistani establishment, particularly from powerful intelligence agencies.
Presidential elections in April represent a major part of Afghanistan’s ongoing transition period, but due to prevailing uncertainties, particularly related to security, Pakistan and other countries in the region are likely to view new developments with trepidation. The polls face several challenges, including ensuring fairness and acceptance of the results, and forging consensus among the country’s ethnic diversity. The danger of political violence is ever-present, and governance patterns are marked by nepotism, weak rule of law, exclusionary patronage networks and corruption. Elections that ensure the participation of all groups and an orderly transfer of power would do much to stabilise the country, and neutrality on the part of the US and other foreign powers is essential for the outcome to have legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans. However, serious questions hang over the elections in terms of how the Taliban will respond and whether they can be included in the political process.
This is perhaps the major threat to an orderly transition in the country. Meanwhile, as the Taliban mobilise against elections, talks between the Pakistan-based leadership of the Afghan Taliban and the governments of the US and Afghanistan are going nowhere. All parties are treating the future as a game of chess, attempting to checkmate each other rather than thinking of regional stability and the future of millions of Afghans.
Competing interests
As the US prepares to withdraw, it seeks to maintain some American soldiers as consultants and trainers in Afghanistan to support the Afghan National Army. The US has indicated its willingness to work with the winner of what it states should be free, fair and credible elections. Though the still-pending Bilateral Security Agreement could translate into the permanent presence of a smaller contingent of US forces in Afghanistan, it remains a critical denominator in the future dispensation of Afghanistan and its security prospects.
Iran is also heavily involved in Afghanistan and has cultivated political ties with many factions, especially the Shia, Farsi-speaking non-Pashtun groups. The Iranian government is content with sending economic aid for the purpose of promoting stability, thereby reducing the possibility of Afghanistan being used as a base for attacks against it. They are especially wary of Sunni militants backed by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan targeting Iranian interests and the Shia population in the region. Iran accounts for nearly 40 percent of exports to Afghanistan and around 2000 Iranian companies operate in Afghanistan. The level of bilateral trade, to the tune of USD 2 billion, has fostered a relationship based on interdependency. The return of the Taliban, and with it the isolation of the country from Iran, would be disastrous for the Afghan economy and long-term political stability.
But while the US-Iran thaw heralds a new beginning at the international level, it also has important regional implications. Though Iran may be suspicious of a continued US presence, it is keen to ensure that a full-scale Taliban regime does not assume power in Kabul. It is also interested in protecting the interests of its traditional allies, such as the Shia Hazara, the Farsiwan Heratis, and Tajiks.
The Taliban remain the proverbial elephant in the room. They will have a say in the fate of Afghanistan. This is why the US is keen to talk to them, and Afghan authorities want further dialogue with them. Both want Pakistan to facilitate this engagement. Pakistan has its own concerns about the future of the Taliban movement within its fold. Pakistan’s facilitation therefore can only be on its own terms. The chessboard is, indeed, confusing and complex.
A relatively stable Afghanistan that does not slide back into civil war and become a haven for transnational militant groups that destabilise regional neighbours, particularly Pakistan, is contingent upon a credible election that produces a legitimate successor to President Karzai. Credible elections will lay the foundation for an eventual political settlement that would take into account the interests of all regional players. But for such a political settlement, neighbouring countries have to adopt and pursue policies of non-alignment and non-interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.
Afghanistan has been economically dependent on Pakistan for a long time. An official trade agreement exists, but its partial implementation has led to the continuation of smuggling. In fact, powerful lobbies supported by smugglers on both sides of the border prevent concrete action on this issue, with smugglers now bit-actors in the conflict. Considering that Afghan exports and imports are mostly reliant on Karachi Port, a secure and economically developing Afghanistan represents a boon to Pakistan’s ailing economy, as it may provide a growing market for Pakistani products. If this economic climate continues to grow, Pakistani workers and companies may have greater access to lucrative reconstruction and development contracts. Also, it would allow for the enhancement of transportation links, both road and rail.