Nuclear tailspin
When it comes to matters of mass life and mass death, it is best to think in simple, even simplistic, terms. And so it is when flagging the urgency for a nuclear arms freeze in South Asia. The fact that newspapers and columnists rarely refer to it hardly means that the Sub-continent is not engaged in a nuclear arms race, which it is. India has come out with its Draft Nuclear Doctrine and Pakistan has announced the command-and-control structure of its nuclear programme. There has been a hardening of nuclear postures on both sides and, like little boys messing for a fight, there is too easy a recourse to the use of threat of nuclear annihilation. This is dangerous to the extreme, but the level of concern (and outright fear) which ought to be there, is simply missing.
By testing its nuclear weaponry in May 1998 at Pokhran, New Delhi's politicians, bureaucrats and scientists set off a lethal trigger, not limited to Pakistan's entirely unnecessary response with its own nuclear blasts at Chaghai. What we saw subsequently was an adventurism by the Pakistani military in Kargil, which was obviously linked to the supposed umbrella provided by its nuclear capability.