Nagaland and the Northeast

The Indian government's announcement in June 2001, of the extension of the five year old Naga ceasefire by another year and enlarging its scope to cover not just the state of Nagaland but also all the neighbouring states which have Naga populations has elicited strong opposition from the states of Assam and Manipur. More than anything else the violent opposition to the Naga ceasefire suggests one thing. There are limits to trying to end insurgencies through secretive deal-making between Indian bureaucrats and leaders of one or the other insurgent organisations.

There is a real possibility that the leadership of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Issac-Muivah), the Naga signatory to the ceasefire agreement, is willing to settle the conflict on honourable terms. But since the idea of Naga independence from India will have to be given up, the Manipuris, Assamese and Arunachalis fear that the quid pro quo for a face-saving compromise maybe the idea of Nagalim—a Nagaland that would include other Naga-inhabited areas lying in these states. The idea of extending the ceasefire to areas other than Nagaland is thus seen as an indicator that such a concession may be made. What is amazing is that, in a democracy, all this action and reaction is based on rumors, fears, anxieties—things that could have been handled by a more open and participatory mode of conflict resolution, say through a peace conference where all interested parties might be represented.