An Electoral Path-breaker

Two portentous results emerged from the parliamentary election in Sri Lanka. The ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) led by President Mahinda Rajapakse won a resounding victory, just short of the two-thirds majority needed for a constitutional change. And almost 40% of the electorate did not vote..The UPFA victory is unprecedented. And it happened despite a precipitous decline in the regime's support base, between January and April 2010. The total number of votes polled by the UPFA at the parliamentary election is significantly lower than the total number of voted polled by Rajapakse at the Presidential election, less than three months ago. In some districts, such as the Rajapakse bastion of Hambantota, the UPFA polled fewer votes last week than it did at the Presidential election of 2005 and even the parliamentary election of 2004..The proportional representation system was introduced by President JR Jayewardene partly to prevent any party from obtaining more than a simple majority. In a robust multiparty democracy, the PR system does indeed prevent victors from gaining huge majorities – as is evidenced by the results of all Lankan elections from 1989. But huge majorities can happen when a multiparty democracy is eroded from within, when the main opposition party is debilitated by repeated defeats and is incapable of mounting an effective politico-electoral challenge to the government. Under the leadership of Ranil Wickremesinghe, the United National Party (UNP) has suffered serial defeats; with each defeat, its political and electoral strength has haemorrhaged. It was this debilitated state of the UNP rather than an increase in its own support base which enabled the UPFA to score a record victory last week..With the latest debacle, Wickremesinghe has demonstrated, yet again, his inability to lead his party to electoral victories. The time is thus ripe for the UNP to try a new experiment – a leadership change. In a significant development, the UNP's manifesto for the parliamentary election made no mention of either the ethnic problem or the need for a political solution. This concession to Sinhala supremacism notwithstanding the UNP performed abysmally in Sinhala majority areas, indicating that on the 'nationalist/patriotic' axis the UNP cannot overtake the UPFA; instead it should focus on areas where the regime is weak, such as the growing economic pains of the middle and lower classes.. The JVP (Peoples Liberation Front) which contested in alliance with Gen. Sarath Fonseka too suffered a disastrous defeat. The JVP is back to what it was during the period of 2000 and 2001. It too needs to shift its focus from anti-devolution (the UPFA is strongly disinclined to devolve power) to other areas and to work in conjunction with the UNP to impede the regime's triumphant march towards a new constitution. . The resounding sound of silence A voter turnout exceeding 70% is the norm at Lankan national elections. Consequently the very low poll is one of the most remarkable (and minatory) features of this parliamentary election. After all, none of the parties advocated a boycott. What transpired was a wholly spontaneous collective action of electoral non-corporation by the people, a massive vote of no-confidence in all parties, from the North to the South. Another related development is the high level of rejected votes island-wide, indicating a tendency to spoil the ballot papers as a mark of protest. Taken together, these figures indicate a degree of voter alienation and disassociation that bode ill for Lankan democracy. Without interested and engaged voters, a democracy can be especially vulnerable to rulers who seek to weaken it from within in order to enhance and perpetuate their power.. The polling was particularly low in the North, indicating a lack of faith and interest in a Sri Lankan future as well as a sense of disillusionment with existing Tamil parties. If left unattended, this mood of acute discontent can strengthen extremist elements in the North. Democratic Tamil parties need to develop a better understanding of the concerns and needs of their electorate in a post-war context. The regime needs to take urgent measures to alleviate the sense of alienation felt by Tamils, a task which requires political action rather than infrastructure development. The current Rajapakse policy of treating the North as occupied enemy territory should end. There should be a significant reduction in army camps and army presence as well as an end to what many Tamils seem to regard as a state sponsored religio-cultural invasion of the North by Sinhala Buddhists (the erection of Buddha statues in areas devoid of Buddhist inhabitants symbolise this process; if these statues come to represent Sinhala domination in Tamil eyes, they may become targets when apathetic inaction is replaced by angry actions, someday).. The abysmally low voter turnout in the North clearly presages the possible danger of renewed separatism in some form. The recent spate of bombings in Russia (including in Moscow) by Chechen rebels demonstrate that armed separatism is a hydra-headed monster. In the absence of a politico-economic programme to deal with the core issues, a new head can come up, years after the monster had been declared well and truly dead. . A New Constitution? President Rajapakse has claimed his party's magnificent victory as a vote of confidence in himself and in his policies. The new parliament will contain several of his close family members (a son, two brothers and a couple of cousins). Candidates identified as Rajapakse loyalists have done outstandingly well at the election; many of them are also Sinhala supremacists. This particular composition of the new parliament will have an impact on the future trajectory of Sri Lanka, since the results can be interpreted as a mandate for Sinhala supremacism and Familial Rule.. Rajapakse has a reputation for striking while the iron is hot; consequently, the constitution making process is likely to begin soon. Engineering the requisite number of defections from the oppositional ranks too will be accorded priority. The new constitution would prevent the compulsory retirement of Rajapakse at the end of his second term, via the removal of Presidential term limits or the institution of a powerful executive premiership sans term limits. The new constitution will exclude some of the more democratic feature of the old constitution such as the 17th Amendment mandating the setting up of independent commissions. It may also replace provincial level devolution with administrative decentralisation to smaller units. A new constitution aimed at perpetuating familial rule will have to make significant concessions to Sinhala supremacists, as they form the main power base of the Rajapakse family project.. As the trend of the election results became obvious, state TV began airing songs hailing Rajapakse as King and Saviour. As the 'ideological state apparatuses' turn unquestioning obedience to Rajapakse into a patriotic virtue, dissent will be equated with anti-patriotism. The UPFA's outstanding win at Thursday's election may mark the definitive beginning of a new journey for Sri Lanka, away from pluralist democracy, towards an authoritarian state, which functions as a protective father to its supporters and a bitter enemy to its opponents.. Tisaranee Gunasekara is a writer based in Colombo.