What really happened? No one knows, really, except perhaps for a select few at the top of the military echelon, and almost none of them are saying anything substantial, even off the record; certainly none has anything to say publicly, apart from making some disgruntled noises about ‘sovereignty’. Today, those who make up Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment find themselves at a critical, fascinating point. With Osama bin Laden having been recovered from their own backyard, they are left with just two options: either concede collusion between members of the military and the intelligence and the very forces that Pakistan is claiming to fight; or claim ‘intelligence failure’. This is not much of a choice, and the military is desperate for something credible to say.
Just nosing around: A recreation of bin Laden's Abbottabad compound in the Internet-based
'virtual world' Second Life
Romila Thapar addresses invitees at the
Southasian relaunch of Himal Southasian,
IIC, New Delhi, January 2013.
flickr / The US Army
On 1 December 2013, Afghan President Hamid Karzai accused the US of cutting fuel supplies to Afghan security forces. Despite US pressure, Karzai continues to stall the signing of a Bilateral Security Agreement.
From our archive:
Subel Bhandari looks at the Strategic Partnership Agreement, noting its avoidance of contentious issues. (April 2012)
Vijay Prashad reviews Syed Saleem Shahzad’s Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11, discussing Taliban strategy in the context of NATO withdrawal. (October 2011)
Aunohita Mojumdar explores questions of accountability in relation to the West’s “hasty exit strategy”. (February 2011)