By Erik Wilson
Image by flickr user izahorsky, under Creative Commons license
On Monday 9 January the two-week UCPN-M (Unified Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist) central committee meeting ended and brought yet another sudden shift in Nepal’s peace process. For 5 years the peace process has been plagued by sudden and radical shifts including numerous changes in government leadership and repeated deadline extensions for introducing a new constitution. Herein lies the danger; as radical shifts occur more frequently, people pay them less attention. Without consistent progress on the peace process the potential for cynicism and unrest among the general populace will rise. Five such years have all but ensured it. And yet, 2012 is here, the ultimate constitution deadline this May is approaching, and the status quo remains. In this context, three products of the central committee meeting deserve a second look.
The Maoist central committee meeting saw an important realignment of factions. Party Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal, better known as Prachanda, moved to support Mohan Baidya and the party hardliners so as to avert a party split. In the process Prachanda agreed to stand firm on party issues that Baidya and his followers see as non-negotiable, namely the preference for a directly elected presidential executive, federal states divided along ethnic lines and the right of Maoist cadres to keep those lands seized during the conflict. Prachanda and Baidya reached a consensus, staved off a split in the party, and ultimately asserted their preference for the peace process over a new revolt.
Also not to be overlooked is the coalition that developed to pressure the UCPN-M in favor of finalising the peace process. The NC (Nepali Congress), CPN-UML (Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist) and 16 other parties presented a united front to the Maoists in favour of continuing the peace process. In response, Prachanda and Baidya agreed to consider a ‘mass mobilization’ of their cadres to rally support for the constitution. This commitment was vague, but when considered alongside the 16 party coalition and hard-line stance of the Baidya faction it would seem to be a recipe for further political gridlock.
Finally, Prachanda, in what was hardly a surprising move, stated on 10 January that he would be willing to take over the prime ministership from Baburam Bhattarai to keep the Baidya faction satisfied. Bhattarai has been viewed as an unsuitable leader by the Baidya faction in light of key capitulations made since his appointment in late August. Shortly after his election, Bhattarai handed over the keys to Maoist arms caches across the country. Seen by many as an important step in the peace process, this compromise was unacceptable for the Baidya faction. Prachanda retracted the statement early on 11 January with the various factions indicating support for a national unity government under Bhattarai’s leadership. Ultimately, the question will be whether those in the Baidya camp are satisfied with this compromise.
Prachanda’s statements and actions increasingly resemble those of a pendulum as he assumes the role of middleman between the various party factions in an effort to keep the peace both internally and externally. As such it is uncertain whether the Maoists can resolve their party conflicts in time to present a unified front in the continuing peace process and constitutional debates. If they hope to preserve some of their agenda they will have to set aside their differences and also accept that the peace achieved in May will not be a singular vision of any one party, but a compromise of all those concerned.
These issues are key, and indicative of deeper party strife that could likely imperil the peace process as spring progresses. The potential for discontent and distrust among the citizenry should be taken seriously and these products of the central committee meeting should be seen as a backdrop to coming events.
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