Over the top

By Erik Wilson

Image by flickr user izahorsky, under Creative Commons license

On Monday 9 January the two-week UCPN-M (Unified Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist) central committee meeting ended and brought yet another sudden shift in Nepal’s peace process. For 5 years the peace process has been plagued by sudden and radical shifts including numerous changes in government leadership and repeated deadline extensions for introducing a new constitution. Herein lies the danger; as radical shifts occur more frequently, people pay them less attention. Without consistent progress on the peace process the potential for cynicism and unrest among the general populace will rise. Five such years have all but ensured it. And yet, 2012 is here, the ultimate constitution deadline this May is approaching, and the status quo remains. In this context, three products of the central committee meeting deserve a second look.

The Maoist central committee meeting saw an important realignment of factions. Party Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal, better known as Prachanda, moved to support Mohan Baidya and the party hardliners so as to avert a party split. In the process Prachanda agreed to stand firm on party issues that Baidya and his followers see as non-negotiable, namely the preference for a directly elected presidential executive, federal states divided along ethnic lines and the right of Maoist cadres to keep those lands seized during the conflict. Prachanda and Baidya reached a consensus, staved off a split in the party, and ultimately asserted their preference for the peace process over a new revolt.

Also not to be overlooked is the coalition that developed to pressure the UCPN-M in favor of finalising the peace process. The NC (Nepali Congress), CPN-UML (Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist) and 16 other parties presented a united front to the Maoists in favour of continuing the peace process. In response, Prachanda and Baidya agreed to consider a ‘mass mobilization’ of their cadres to rally support for the constitution. This commitment was vague, but when considered alongside the 16 party coalition and hard-line stance of the Baidya faction it would seem to be a recipe for further political gridlock.

Finally, Prachanda, in what was hardly a surprising move, stated on 10 January that he would be willing to take over the prime ministership from Baburam Bhattarai to keep the Baidya faction satisfied. Bhattarai has been viewed as an unsuitable leader by the Baidya faction in light of key capitulations made since his appointment in late August. Shortly after his election, Bhattarai handed over the keys to Maoist arms caches across the country. Seen by many as an important step in the peace process, this compromise was unacceptable for the Baidya faction. Prachanda retracted the statement early on 11 January with the various factions indicating support for a national unity government under Bhattarai’s leadership. Ultimately, the question will be whether those in the Baidya camp are satisfied with this compromise.

Prachanda’s statements and actions increasingly resemble those of a pendulum as he assumes the role of middleman between the various party factions in an effort to keep the peace both internally and externally. As such it is uncertain whether the Maoists can resolve their party conflicts in time to present a unified front in the continuing peace process and constitutional debates. If they hope to preserve some of their agenda they will have to set aside their differences and also accept that the peace achieved in May will not be a singular vision of any one party, but a compromise of all those concerned.

These issues are key, and indicative of deeper party strife that could likely imperil the peace process as spring progresses. The potential for discontent and distrust among the citizenry should be taken seriously and these products of the central committee meeting should be seen as a backdrop to coming events.

As Lord Balfour noted in his introduction to Walter Bagehot’s The English Constitution, “[the] whole political machinery presupposes a people so fundamentally at one that they can safely afford to bicker; and so sure of their own moderation that they are not dangerously disturbed by the never-ending din of political conflict.”

Exhibit 1

Exhibit 2

Britain is an oddity. A tiny island nation that rose to create the largest land Empire in world history and spread its language, culture and political institutions to the farthest reaches of the globe. Since 1945, it’s world stature has declined precipitously as it shrunk to a shadow of its former self. But the narrative of rise and fall is not merely a narrative confined to Britain, it is the story of the West at large: of Western Europe and Europe-inspired societies like those on the North American continent.

Living at the beginning of the 21st Century, we find that those societies who in the past were so sure of their superiority: material and intellectual, now find themselves running a gross confidence deficit, their material prosperity no longer secure and their intellectual doctrines in question. Polemicists of the Right have prophecised the downfall of the West for some time. This “downfall” however, is unlikely to be a dramatic event. It is more likely to be a gradual decline, slow but sure. The West shall go down but not with a not a bang, but a whimper.

But let us return for the time being to Britain and the nature of its contemporary life. In the latter half of the 20th century, Britain embarked on a policy of allowing mass-migration from the non-West and thus acquired a substantial population of non-Westerners in a fit of absent-mindedness, a policy that was prophecised to lead to disaster according to one controversial figure in post-War British life.

Britain’s loss of confidence in its sense of self – be that self good or bad – coupled with the reality of a substantial population of assertive non-Westerners, especially extremist Muslims who have appropriated liberal-democratic notions of Representation, Rights-based discourse and Egalitarianism and successfully synthesised it with the strengths of a Global Political Islam – has led to a state of affairs that is altogether explosive. Assertive Muslim extremism in Britain is matched by subaltern-nativist movements of the white working class such as the English Defence League (EDL) and white nationalist political parties such as the British National Party (BNP). Lying between these two extremes is Britain’s apolitical-apathetic majority and a pusillanimous political class.

Lord Balfour’s characterisation of the English then as “…a people so fundamentally at one that they can safely afford to bicker; and so sure of their own moderation that they are not dangerously disturbed by the never-ending din of political conflict” rings a tad hollow. Sometimes, England feels just like Weimar.

Postscript: To watch fascinating interactions between the BNP and non-whites click here and here.

Authored by Vijay Vikram

The ‘Freedom in the World – 2004’ report by Freedom House stated that ‘The junta rules by decree, controls the judiciary, suppresses all basic rights, and commits human rights abuses with impunity. Military officers hold all cabinet positions, and active or retired officers hold all top posts in all ministries. Official corruption is reportedly rampant both at the higher and local levels.’

The mighty and mysterious junta, i.e. ruling military council, in Myanmar was officially known as State Peace and Development Council. The SPDC was made-up of 11 Generals (all of them Burman Buddhists) who were then serving in the Tatmadaw or Myanmar Armed Forces. The now ‘supposedly-extinct’ junta under the leadership of Thein Sein had initiated a seven-step ‘roadmap to democracy‘ in 2003, whereby the 2008 Constitutional referendum and 2010 General Election marked the fourth and fifth steps respectively. Little shocking and pleasing to know the tyrannical junta, which was globally ill-famous for its unconditional repressive reign, treaded on such a merciful track.

Considering the present much-altered prevalent scenario in Myanmar, the big question is: Whether the military junta in Myanmar has practically ceased to maintain its identity after it was disbanded following hand-over of power to the new civilian government after the 2010 general election? The obvious answer according to the state official proclamations is: Yes! However, the Western media has wriggled facts to give a contrary viewpoint – the military junta still exists as it was before the preceding general election, with its powers untouched if not augmented, but it has merely taken-up a new form. Today its members have dissipated within the 2 newly formed political parties- Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and National Unity Party (NUP), and keeping their former fraternal bond intact. These 2 political parties are currently holding absolute majority in the newly elected Myanmar parliament. The erstwhile members of SPDC still wield extensive sway among the elected Cabinet, which comprise their lackeys i.e junior officers and trustworthy civilians. According to credible sources, it is mere 4 out of the 30 ministers of the new Cabinet who have no military background. Hereby am putting forth two rational questions that contextually are more relevant and meaningful.  First, whether or not the tyrannical junta regime in Myanmar has given way to the elected Parliament? Second, the reasons for yes or no to the former question?

The situational answer to the first question is- partial Yes. The former junta regime is gradually dishing-out power to the elected parliamentarians. Though at present, the disbanded junta members themselves or their protégées are holding almost all the ministries. However symbolic space in the redressed elite-ruling council is being granted to a handful elected civilians. With the passage of time junta is more likely to hand-over more number of auxiliary ministries to the elected civilians and also attempt to conciliate with the democratic heartthrob of Western media- Aung San Suu Kyi.

Also answering the second question from a situational perspective, it is to be acknowledged that the turn-around actions executed by junta clearly imply it endeavored to reap democracy at the cost of its earlier supreme dictatorship. Why such? First, the international pressure was mounting with every passing day. The sanctions (like embargo on exported items from Myanmar, entry ban of selected officials, ban on sale of arms etc.) imposed unilaterally and multilaterally by individual countries and international/regional organizations on account of dismal human rights situation in the country had accumulated to a choking point. The second, a democratic government is the only legitimate instrument that has the potent to give the elusive members of junta much-needed legitimacy and protection under international laws to cling on to power. The 2011 Arab Spring has deeply instilled the idea among the people across the world that autocratic regimes need to be imminently replaced by elected democratic governments. If the Junta would have continued to exist, it would have been extremely difficult on its part to withstand the mounting internal dissent and external pressure. Third, this was the best possible way-out of the self-imposed isolation and bring-up international integration. The Junta knew it could not perennially rely on its ‘closest ally’ China for meeting the state needs in this highly globalized world. Plus it knew the value of having new strategic and economic partners in the face of changing times. Fourth, a ‘military-controlled’ democratic government is the best mode for further wielding individual and collective sway of the ‘supposedly-defunct’ junta within the state. Today the structured distribution of power and more number of subjects within the ambit of governance is giving the reclusive junta members a reason to smile. Last but not the least, the undertaken actions have bestowed the former junta members with the required legality to individually strike lucrative financial deals under the civilian garb. The opening up of the precious Pandora’s Box has undoubtedly drawn much attention of the business-minded capitalists from the region and elsewhere.

However the growing internal discontent among various ethnic and political groups within the state can anyday flare-up the seemingly tranquil transition to democracy. The jitters of the military rulers to go for an immediate full-fledged transition to an open democratic society is clearly visible from the recent deportation of Chinese-Malaysian Actress Michelle Yeoh, who is playing the role of Aung San Suu Kyi in an upcoming film- The Lady, straight from the Yangon International Airport before she could meet Suu Kyi. If the Tatmadaw lets loose its grip over the societal proceedings not only the natives but people from across the world will practically gung ho to champion the cause of pluralist democracy in Myanmar, which ‘The Lady’ has been tirelessly fighting all her life. The day is not far when all the military rulers will apologetically give a standing ovation to this brave lady; the very day junta will actually disappear into the thin air.

~ Hriday Sarma is a News Editor at Digital Publishing Solutions Pioneer, Aptara Inc.

Image: www.thehindu.com

By Shazia Nigar

It was a day to remember. After all, American movies with images of black hats flying up in the air while smiling happy people hug each other have created quite an euphoria around what we call the convocation ceremony. However, around 15 students at Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai, did not partake in this merry making. The boycott resulted out of the decision of the administration to invite Mr Jairam Ramesh, Minister of Environment and Forest as Chief Guest at the convocation. Mr Ramesh, has in the recent past cleared controversial projects that raise grave concerns over human rights, environmental degradation and violation of constitutional laws.

As Mr.Ramesh stepped out of his polished posh car he was greeted with students in bright yellow t-shirts that carried anti-nuclear messages. Several others, as they received their certificate, handed out anti-nuclear badges in return. The students had a clear message to get across to our ‘Minister with a sympathetic ear’ (courtesy the Bt brinjal lok adalats): ‘NO JAITAPUR’ and ‘NO POSCO’.

Later, in an interactive session with the students Mr Ramesh stated ‘For the economic development of the country at a GDP of 8% to 9%, we need to rely on energy sources such as coal, gas, hydel and nuclear power. We, of course, need to invest in renewable energy sources but they will not be able to sustain our growth.’ Yes, we are a growing economy. There is a need for greater infrastructure. But is growth the only trajectory we should be aiming for. Isn’t equitable allocation of resources, not the only, but an essential part of the solution? Secondly, growth, but at what cost?

The Jaitapur nuclear power plant is set to displace 40,000 people, their economy and a thriving ecosystem. Further, the site is rated by scientists as Zone 3, which is prone to high seismic activity. Jaitapur witnessed an earthquake rated 6.3, which left 9000 dead, in 1993. The lessons we should learn from Japan’s recent nuclear debacle only warn us against the impending disaster. Further the power requirement for Ratnagiri and Sindhurgh, project affected sites, is a mere 180 MW above which 4663 MW is exported out of these areas. It is not clear as to what use the electricity generated will be used for. Most likely, it will be sold of to industrialists at subsidized rates.

Interestingly, the report brought out by TISS on Jaitapur was refuted by the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, on the basis that it consists of people’s opinion and is ‘not scientific’. This reflects a complete disregard for concerns of the very people at whose cost the project will come up.

Similarly, the POSCO steel plant in Orissa threatens the very identity of the project affected people adamant to stick to their ‘paan, dhan, meeno’ (beetle leaves, rice and fish) which sustain them. The project is set to affect 22,000 people in Dhinkia and several others in the adjoining Gram Sabhas of Nuagaon and Govindpur. This clearance violates the Forest Rights Acts which states that the consent of the affected Gram Sabhas is absolutely necessary for the establishment of any new project.

Both of these projects are not isolated developments. The advent of liberalization has led to the intensification of a development that functions on an economics that benefits a few while impinging on the rights of many. The call of the time is for structural changes. One that ensures benefits flow to all and which ensures that growth is not a term of exclusion. The protesting students of TISS are assurance of the fact that there is scope for these changes. It is the very students dubbed as the ‘Cola generation’ who are disturbed by what they see around them. And being disturbed by status quo is always the beginning of a new trajectory. The thoughts here are not new. But the spate of recent disturbing events compel me to repeat them again.

–Shazia Nigar is a student of  Media and Cultural Studies,TISS. She is presently interning with Himal Southasian.

Nepal stands at a crossroad between the Maoist momentum and a democratic constitution.

By Kanak Mani Dixit

Spring, the season of political upheaval in Nepal, began with the elevation of the left-liberal CPN (UML) party’s Jhalanath Khanal to prime minister. While ending a seven month deadlock in government formation, however, Khanal’s election was built on a platform of deception against Nepal’s peace process. Now that he has got the position he so tenaciously sought, will Khanal be able to deliver the political stability necessary for writing the new constitution by the deadline of 28 May?

Khanal felt cheated when the existing power balance back in May 2009 propelled his colleague Madhav Kumar Nepal to prime ministership, and since then he worked clandestinely with Maoist leaders to bring down the government. Nepal resigned last June 2010, fearing a humiliating defeat in passage of the budget through a campaign led by his own party chairman. Thereafter, the parliament entered a seven month period of farcical elections designed to malign the parliamentary process.

To maintain himself at his party’s helm, it was important for Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal to be prime minister once again. However, he could not gain trust because he had reneged on the promise to disband the 19,000-plus Maoist ex-combatant force according to agreed formulae. Street brinkmanship, threats of revolt and an attempt to buy 50 members of parliament at one crore rupees per head all backfired on Dahal. But under no circumstance did he want to concede the chair to deputy Baburam Bhattarai, and so on 3 February he dramatically forced the party to back Khanal of the rival UML.

The Khanal-Dahal coalition came together on the basis of a secret seven-point deal that was soon exposed, in which the UML chairman promised to establish a separate force of Maoist ex-combatants, and acquiesced letter-and-spirit to the Maoist position on constitutionalism. The unwritten part of the deal was for the UCPN (Maoist) to get Home Affairs, and Dahal to become prime minister when the term of the Constituent Assembly ended, and it came time to prepare for elections.

Cantonment disbandment

Under the peace agreement that ended the ‘people’s war’ in 2006, the Maoist had assured the citizenry and international community that the cantonments would be disbanded under supervision of a Special Committee in which the party is also a member. This should have been done by September 2008, with some ex-combatants integrated into the security forces and the rest rehabilitated. An elaborate show of handover to the Special Committee was even enacted as late as 22 January this year, but the secret deal brought the peace process crashing.

Even with other matters pending, disbandment of the Maoist fighting force would provide psychological relief to the populace and generate confidence for the constitution-drafting. Creating a new Maoist force, whether for frontier defence or industrial security as suggested, would merely camouflage the continuity of the ‘PLA’. Besides this fighting force, the UCPN (Maoist) is a party with its own paramilitary, and the party plenum last November formally announced plans for ‘revolt’ and ‘state capture’. This is what the cadre have been primed for. If the Maoists get the Home Ministry – de jure as they want or de facto as Prime Minister Khanal is inclined to – the state’s police and armed constabulary would both come under UCPN (Maoist) command. This would push society into a critical stand-off.

The pact between the two chairmen heightened political polarisation just when the parties should have been coming together for the drafting. Such a point was almost reached in 26 January, when the principal political players including the Nepali Congress had agreed to the Maoist chairman leading the government once there was agreement on the numbers for ex-combatants integration. Chairman Dahal returned to the negotiations from his lunch break to reject everything he had earlier conceded — the obstacle to the peace process lay squarely in the schisms within his party.

Contentious Interpretation

The left-democratic alliance between the UML, the Nepali Congress, the Madhesi and other parties, which were united for a democratic constitution, stands shattered following Khanal’s Maoist embrace. The deal, worked out by a cabal of ambitious young supporters of Khanal, shook the UML down to its foundations with the possibility of outright takeover by the Maoist party.

Confronted by the secret deal made by their own chairman, the UML Central Committee went into paroxysms of interpretation. With the Maoists publicly insisting on implementation of the written and unwritten commitments in the ‘secret’ deal, the UML leadership announced baldly that the seven points allowed the peace process to continue under the Special Committee, and that the Home Ministry would be kept by the prime minister himself ‘for the moment’. Such interpretation was bound to have diminishing returns as Khanal consolidated himself as prime minister — even though it has been a slow start for someone who claimed that a new government would be formed within hours of the fall of the Nepal Government in the middle of 2010.

Over at the UCPN (Maoist), as Dahal foisted successive self-serving decisions on his party, there was a feeling of humiliation in the ranks for having supported the hated rival, albeit with a partial chairman. To silence growing dissidence, Dahal went around claiming that formation of the Khanal government represented “a victory over expansionist India”.

The extreme polarisation born of the secret pact has killed the possibility of Nepal’s new constitution being written on time, even as civil society stalwarts go through the motions of demanding fealty to the extended deadline. The stalwarts fail to consider that a constitution cannot be written when one party has its personal fighting force and has completely disregarded the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord, which is part of the Interim Consitution as annex. As we speak, the Maoist plans are for complete integration, one way or another, as laid out in the Khanal-Dahal pact.

The stalwarts must also understand that it is better not to have a new constitution than to have an un-democratic one. The values of open society, reflected in the 1990 Constitution chaperoned by the just-departed Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, must be protected if we are to proceed towards an era of social justice where no community is left behind. The Maoist stand on key constitutional principles are the kind that would give us a People’s Republic of Nepal, and the little concessions recently seen to be made by Chairman Dahal are merely to buy time and create a false sense of momentum among the gullible/partisan analysts.

Last week, the Maoists announced plans to augment their Young Communist League with another paramilitary force. The cadre have been corrupted by country-wide extortion and contracting, and are primed for ‘revolt’ as a means to maintain their income stream. The leadership obviously wants to destroy the citizens’ self-esteem, weakening the national will so that no ethical barrier or set of values can block their attempt to redefine Nepal into a closed society.

Over the spring, with Prime Minister Khanal as handmaiden, the Maoists will try to conduct a political blitzkrieg using physical force, psychological intimidation and ultra-nationalism. Pushpa Kamal Dahal believes that chaos of any kind can be converted to his personal advantage. If he decides to go for it, to try and foist a Maoist constitution amidst a controlled state, it is up to Nepal’s people to resist. The rest of the world can only watch and wish us well.